Ali Abdelaziz – Fuqra Files

16. Mission: MOA’s Overseas Operations

Ryan Mauro — Mon, 21 Aug 2023 18:06:41 +0000

16. Mission: MOA’s Overseas Operations

The U.S. government asked Abdelaziz to arrange the travel of MOA members to its overseas camps so they could identify who was traveling where. He claims that significant amounts of money were transferred to MOA through him for the purpose of setting up these camps so they could be monitored.

“I was the guy that traveled for MOA. I established jammaats (communes). I could set up jamaats overseas,” he told Mawyer.

Abdelaziz said he went to Venezuela, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to establish and assist MOA “jamaats” (meaning “communities”) but offered few details to Mawyer when he met with him.

In 2006, Ali Abdelaziz went to Port of Spain, Trinidad, to prepare for the arrival of convicted terrorist Barry Adams, who spearheaded MOA’s plot to perpetrate “Canada’s 9/11.” Canada was deported him and his other Trini accomplices back to their home country.

Using the name “Khalifah Abu Bakr,” Adams is known within the group as being the most influential official aside from Gilani’s sons. Adams’ son, Hussein Adams, is the Chief Executive of MOA. Abdelaziz described him as being “like a ghost…he really is.”

Few MOA members have even seen the face of “Khalifah Abu Bakr” or know anything about him. Many don’t even know that he is Barry Adams. He briefly surfaced when a video was posted online in 2008, causing a stir within the organization.

Adams and White Hawk Security International set up shop in Trinidad.

MOA has long operated in Trinidad and is suspected of having had links to the Jamaat al-Muslimeen group there, particularly when it launched a bloody coup in 1990. A Caribbean intelligence source aware of terrorist activities in Trinidad told Ryan Mauro that MOA was linked to Jamaat al-Muslimeen and operated under its auspices in Venezuela, as well.

The source also confirmed that Adams has repeatedly traveled between Trinidad and Venezuela.

Abdelaziz said that Venezuela has the most promising MOA community outside of North America. He refused to divulge any details about what went on there, except to say that a major MOA leader is there.

The Muslim community there is paranoid about any American presence and suspected every Westerner of being a spy, making it extremely difficult for the U.S. to develop sources there.

Abdelaziz said he saw that the Muslim community was extremely supportive of then-dictator Hugo Chavez and his regime, even though he is not a Muslim. He recalled attending a speech by Chavez where he began by reciting the Quran.

MOA had an opportunity to “establish a home” in Venezuela because there are many wealthy Arabs, particularly Lebanese and Syrians. He only vaguely referred to “the richest people in Venezuela…I got involved…I was supposed to do certain things.”

As pointed out on this website, the 2015 address for MOA’s office in Caracas matches that of a building owned by an insurance company run by by Pedro Torres Ciliberto, who has been a fugitive since 2009. He is wanted on charges of money laundering and bank fraud and is accused of assisting international criminals in hiding money in offshore accounts. He was close to the Chavez regime.

Abdelaziz declined to give any further details about who in MOA was in Venezuela, but he said major figures are moving back and forth to the country. Sheikh Gilani was even talking about moving there from Pakistan.

Abdelaziz described the governments of Morocco and Egypt as particularly hostile to the MOA communities in their countries. He also vaguely referred to the British government being concerned about a specific MOA figure who he did not name.

In 2008, Abdelaziz went to Egypt. MOA has had a presence in Egypt as far back as 1983, when its newspaper listed a “correspondent” named Hasan Abdul Aziz there. MOA had ties to the Egyptian Gama’a Islamiiyya terrorist group led by the “Blind Sheikh.”

Abdelaziz claimed that the U.S. government was pressured to put his life and the lives of his family members at risk in Egypt.

“I pulled a lot of strings in Egypt. And my name was very much on everything. I had to use the help of my brother. He’s full Egyptian. They put my family in a dangerous situation,” he said.

The Egyptian authorities detained him. It is unclear what happened.

He also said that the Department of Homeland Security caused a lot of problems for his family, particularly his brother, who “helped whenever.”

MOA-affiliated sources confirmed that members traveled to Egypt and stayed with Abdelaziz’s family members, who treated them with great hospitality.

He says he helped about 10 MOA members get visas to go to Egypt. A total of 15 MOA members were with him in Egypt.

Abdelaziz told Mawyer that the Egyptian government dislikes MOA and anyone associated with them, so he’d be at great risk if he was deported back to his home country.

22. “They bullshit them. They bullshit them.”

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:58:01 +0000

22. “They bullshit them. They bullshit them.”

Ali Abdelaziz lamented the lack of cooperation between the federal, state and local agencies when it came to intelligence-sharing and investigations. This dysfunction, he felt, is part of the reason that MOA is able to get complimentary remarks from law enforcement personnel who are kept in the dark and manipulated by MOA’s public relations campaign.

“They fight so stupidly,” he complained.

He claimed that the NYPD Intelligence Division instructed him not to share the intelligence they gathered with the FBI, and attributed turf wars to the tension between the two over his service as an informant. The Department of Homeland Security was also allegedly involved in the in-fighting.

Our own study of MOA indicates that this lack of intelligence-sharing is indeed a problem.

For example, law enforcement will be left in the dark about what is known regarding MOA and are sometimes assured that there’s no derogatory information. Some FBI field offices will give statements to the press to tamp down concern about MOA, while documents will later be declassified showing that there was/is an ongoing investigation.

A source with direct awareness of the investigation into MOA and White Hawk Security International confirmed that the intelligence on the group was tightly held. As far as he knew, it was not even shared with other federal agencies and certainly not the local or state law enforcement agencies.

“Federal agencies are compartmentalized. I was never told that the concern was real until I had a real need to know. Others who raised the topic were told to leave the subject alone and the conversations ended. It even happened to me after I completed my duties that required me to be briefed on them,” he said.

Abdelaziz said that MOA made a concerted effort to makeover its image after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A top objective was to “bullshit” law enforcement and the media with kindness and condemnations of extremism.

One friendly meeting with law enforcement involved a picnic at the “Islamville” camp in York County, South Carolina. MOA posted pictures of the picnic on their website to claim that they are law enforcement partners maligned by anti-Muslim paranoia.

The PR effort in South Carolina even got then-Congressman Mick Mulvaney on MOA’s side after a November 2015 visit to Islamville. His defense of the group and photos with members were proudly posted on one of MOA’s websites for years after. Mulvaney is now President Trump’s Chief of Staff.

According to Abdelaziz and other sources who were first-hand witnesses, MOA has a choreographed routine for such events:

“The FBI goes up there and visits them. They bullshit them, they bullshit them. When they go visit the camps, after that, they take the American flag down and put their flag back. Slick! Actually, I did that. I took a picture of the American flag one time, when the FBI left, they put their flag back up. I took a picture and provided it to the NYPD.”

He mentioned that the visits to the camps are prearranged with limited access. Pointing to one picture of law enforcement personnel with MOA members and their children, he said he was at the meeting and saw how MOA sought to deceive them about the size of their families:

“This is nothing. Over half the kids are hiding in the back when they come to visit. MOA leaders tell them, ‘You go hide in the back. Don’t come out.’ It’s about three times more kids than what is in that picture. I was there.”

Abdelaziz was visibly frustrated with the public embrace of MOA by the New York State Police and New York FBI personnel involved in community outreach:

“They come. They hang out. They eat food. They get photos taken with the leaders and kids. They’re not really investigating. These people aren’t investigating them at all.

Of course, you have to understand, these guys don’t know. There are other FBI agents in the know. The NYPD is in the know. But they don’t share their information with these guys…the New York State police don’t know shit.”

He believed that those in the government who do know the truth about MOA simply “don’t want people to know.”

Another “slick” move by MOA was the formation of its interfaith front named the United Muslim Christian Forum. The Forum’s website and statements used anti-Semitic themes to try to unite Christians and Muslims against Jewish enemies.

Abdelaziz was struck at how then-mayor of Binghamton, Matthew T. Ryan, attended the Forum’s event and publicly supported it and MOA. Ryan Mauro, founder of Fuqra Files, attended its 2011 event and wrote about the experience.

Ryan Mauro talking to Fuqra/MOA official Hasib Haqq at the group’s United Muslim Christian Forum event (2011).

Mauro talking with Matthew Gardner, senior MOA official from the group’s Red House, Virginia camp, at the UMCF event in 2011.

21. “It’s sad. It’s sad to see this in America.”

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:57:25 +0000

21. “It’s sad. It’s sad to see this in America.”

Sheikh Gilani’s exploitation of women and children is what most bothered him.

The estimates that MOA had 1,500 to 3,000 members was grossly underestimated, he felt. The real number had to be closer to 15,000 when the children are included.

Other sources agreed, mentioning that the number probably doesn’t account for the group’s international expansions. They also said MOA was having success in recruiting Somalis, inside and outside of America. Several violent terrorist plots against MOA, specifically Islamberg, followed by sympathetic media coverage, are said to be actually helping the group.

Abdelaziz said that children are being trapped into lives of crime and poverty.

“A lot of the children that grow up there become drug dealers. Some become murderers,” he said.

Kids were being taught that it is acceptable to engage in crimes that victimize non-Muslims, as long as it is for the cause of Gilani and, therefore, Allah. Many become drug dealers who donate a portion of the proceeds to the organization and Gilani.

He said that, as far as he knew, the drugs weren’t being sold to other MOA members on the camps.

Other MOA-affiliated sources explain that producing and consuming drugs is forbidden but selling them is permissible if it is done to advance the cause. Since the drug trade is seen as part of the Zionist conspiracy against Islam, it is acceptable to use it against the enemy.

Abdelaziz was particularly disturbed about criminal activity committed by “the young guys with gangs” in New York, who he said he didn’t hang out. Sources say he is referring to MOA-linked gangs like the “Land Boys,” which is known to conduct drug trafficking away from the premises of Islamberg.

The DEA has investigated and arrested MOA members including the “Land Boys” for crimes like drug trafficking and robbery. Documents from one 2007 DEA investigation said that partnering agencies “believe that through a narcotics distribution network these individuals were generating funds and then taking these funds back to the [Islamberg] compound.” It also said that MOA members in the area were transferring money to the group’s leadership in Pakistan.

Gilani prohibits birth control and condoms so that the organization would grow as rapidly as possible, with women often having eight or nine children. Almost every woman is on taxpayer-provided public assistance, and “use public services as crazy,” while sending a portion back to the MOA leadership and Gilani.

There is a huge amount of welfare fraud and food stamp fraud, particularly in Colorado and Binghamton, New York, he said.

He flatly stated that it is “approved by MOA” and not the work of a few rogue individuals. He explained:

“A lot of them do welfare fraud. They do all kinds of scams. All kinds of scams. MOA does not want to lose out on opportunities of a crime being committed. They might have a guy sell a $10 drug or do a pickpocket. Maybe they have someone else, like in Philadelphia and Virginia, go sell a kilo of drugs. The drug money goes back to Gilani.”

The fraud against the U.S. government or other entities is permissible because it is taking back money from the “Satanic-Zionist” enemies of Islam.

Families are crammed into small trailers, with two families often sharing a single mobile home. Girls were pressured into arranged and polygamous marriages at young age. The children living on the compounds are mostly homeschooled, as public education is discouraged, and so the majority are practically illiterate and “brainwashed.” He said:

“They have school on the Hancock compound [Islamberg]. But a lot of the kids don’t go to school. 90 percent of them can barely read or write. It’s sad. It’s sad to see this in America.”

The population suffers in poverty, stuck in a situation that denies them the pursuit of the American dream, so that Gilani and his family could live large.

He had seen the pictures of Gilani’s cars and multiple homes in Pakistan. And he remembered when MOA spent about $15,000—money provided by the impoverished members—to purchase and send video cameras to Pakistan for Gilani’s studio.

Ali would not detail what crimes he reported to the NYPD, saying, he feared “it would violate my immunity” agreement and lead to his deportation. He strongly implied that he reported evidence of MOA members involved in murders and, as he put it, “some very, very serious crimes” where “people got hurt very badly.”

Abdelaziz said that the evidence of human rights abuses that he provided the NYPD should have been enough for the government to take action:

“That’s one of the things, honestly, this is what I think. This is what I think is the biggest disgrace: The abuse. The only thing is, nobody on the camps says anything. Of course, they’re afraid…

…Some people are there because they’re scared. They don’t know what to do. They have their children there. They’re scared of the wrath of Gilani. They think, you know, they’re afraid they will get punished. They are so controlled, so brainwashed. It’s crazy.”

Those who leave the group and potentially expose them are at serious risk.

“You have to understand, these people are not the nicest people. They have to do what they got to do. I know this for sure. They will do whatever. They have tried to kill their own people,” he explained.

Abdelaziz then explicitly warned Martin Mawyer that, due to his research drawing negative attention to MOA, “You are in danger.”

Other sources who were or are affiliated with MOA also talk about the immense difficulty of leaving the organization and even greater danger of talking to law enforcement or the press about what is happening.

Most, if not all, of your friends and family are in the cult. You likely have a criminal record and poor education, making employment and therefore self-sufficiency a daunting task. The comfort of community is beyond quantification.

In many cases, those who leave or begin to distance themselves from MOA find life outside of the group to be too difficult to adjust to. They come back, or at least, make amends.

Reporting to law enforcement is an even taller order.

To begin with, you’d be ratting out people who—despite their transgressions—probably have some fond memories of and affection towards. You could report a crime committed by someone you don’t care about, but it is quite possible for the investigation to lead the authorities to those you do care about.

Secondly, there’s a lack of confidence that law enforcement will even do anything with the information. After all, MOA has existed since the early 1980’s.

Then, there’s the well-known fact that MOA members have been employed in law enforcement and different government sectors. This fact raises the fear that you could be caught, and you and your family will suffer the consequences.

And finally, once you expose MOA, there’s no going back. If you can’t make it in your new life, have no recourse. You cannot make amends. You cannot be helped. You’re completely on your own.

That is why the testimonies of Ali Abdelaziz and the few other defectors are so critical and groundbreaking

20. “Modern Warrior Slaves”

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:42:20 +0000

20. “Modern Warrior Slaves”

Ali Abdelaziz summarized MOA as “Modern Warrior Slaves,” loyal cult members ready to do absolutely anything for their Pakistan-based leader, from living a life of a poverty so he can get every dime possible to dying in combat at his request.

He said:

“You have to understand this. These kids, all they been living for their whole lives is they want to fight a holy war. These are kids. They start at age 17 in the compound and they become a gangster, they wanna become gangsters for what they think is a holy war…

Let me tell you something. If Gilani tomorrow told everyone, set yourself on fire, everybody would burn themselves. This has been going on for 30 years. And people praise him. They give him money. They kiss his feet. It’s crazy. These people are slaves. I call them ‘the Modern Warrior Slaves.’ That’s what I call them…”

His warning echoed the words of Khalid Khawaja, a friend of both Gilani and Osama Bin Laden, who said Gilani’s followers were even more devoted than Bin Laden’s. If the U.S. government pushed Gilani to declare jihad, MOA would “blow [up] like a volcano.”

Abdelaziz emphasized to Mawyer that MOA is not an accurate representation of the religion of Islam:

“The way they treat Gilani is forbidden in Islam. I don’t believe any of this stuff from this guy in Pakistan. He’s crazy. They treat Gilani like he is a god. You understand? They have his picture all over their houses. I’ll tell you what. I love my religion. I think Islam is a great religion. But the way he preaches Islam makes everybody think we’re all crazy.”

MOA members treat him like a god and believe he can turn them into monkeys or pigs if they disobey him, based on a radical interpretation of Sura 5, Verse 60 in the Koran.

To them, Gilani is omnipresent, able to be anywhere at once, and can live forever. He will never die—he will only choose to leave his body. Abdelaziz estimated that 95% of MOA members believe in Gilani’s divinity.

Residents of MOA “villages” are forced to follow puritanical laws with severe punishments for violations, including lashings. He knew of people punished for cursing, watching forbidden TV shows, disobeying the leadership, fornication, lying to officials, etc.

In one incident, he saw a 50-year old woman tied to a tree and lashed. MOA Chief Executive Hussein Adams stood by and watched as it happened. He even saw children getting beaten.

When kids were asked what they want to do when they grow up, a common response was that they wanted to fight for Gilani.

He warned about the prevalence of guns and willingness to use them.

Abdelaziz confirmed the authenticity of the video of women training in firearms and combat at Islamberg that was filmed around 2002. However, he curiously changed the conversation, saying, “I’m not gonna comment on the women.”

There are a “whole lot of guns,” he said. He said he intercepted one illegal gun shipment for the NYPD and was disappointed by the lack of action by law enforcement.

19. Abdelaziz Approaches Mawyer

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:41:16 +0000

19. Abdelaziz Approaches Mawyer

In 2010, Martin Mawyer’s office received an unexpected call from someone with a thick accent. The person was Ali Abdelaziz and he wanted to meet in person. He offered to help Mawyer in exposing the threat posed by MOA.

Abdelaziz was hoping Mawyer could help him get into contact with NYPD Detective David Calla, who oversaw Abdelaziz’s work as an informant. Mawyer had talked to him on the phone to discuss MOA years earlier.

Mawyer called Calla and was surprised by the ferocious response. Calla asked if Abdelaziz was trying to threaten him and his family. He then predicted that Abdelaziz was going to be deported back to Egypt and said that if Abdelaziz kept asking questions about him that he’d be thrown in jail.

It was obvious to Mawyer that Abdelaziz’s former partners in law enforcement viewed him as a threat.

Abdelaziz’s tone towards Calla was different. He said, “You know, I love the guy,” and suggested that the hostility was “coming from people higher up.”

One of the major motivations for Abdelaziz to talk to Mawyer about MOA was to combat anti-Muslim sentiment and phobia. He repeatedly mentioned how MOA and other extremists provoke backlashes against innocent Muslims.

He was also interested in appealing to Martin Mawyer, who, as President of the Christian Action Network, was accused of “Islamophobia” by MOA.

While reiterating that he meant no disrespect to Mawyer, he emphasized, “I don’t want to change who you are but I just am trying, maybe, to open a door for you to know Muslims…I don’t want to insult you.”

Mawyer, who has since engaged other Muslims who have left MOA, explained that he has nothing against Muslims and understands the important value of Muslim partners in fighting extremism.

By talking to Mawyer, Abdelaziz provided damning and jaw-dropping testimony about life inside the MOA cult.

His explosive allegations are substantiated by declassified documents, law enforcement sources and other MOA-affiliated sources.

18. The Spy Game Comes to an End

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:39:04 +0000

18. The Spy Game Comes to an End

As Ali Abdelaziz’s relationship with MOA became strained, so did his relationships with the NYPD and FBI.

According to Enemies Within, the FBI’s skepticism of Abdelaziz grew after he was detained by the Egyptian authorities. The FBI pressured the NYPD into bringing him to a local FBI office to take a polygraph on April 8, 2008, conducted by agent Michael Templeton.

The polygraph indicted he answered deceptively about whether he intended to be truthful. When asked whether he disclosed his covert work for the U.S. government to someone in Egypt, the polygraph indicated he was being deceptive. He was also believed to be lying about some undisclosed activity in New Mexico.

With the pressure on, Abdelaziz asked for a bathroom break.

While he was in the bathroom, the FBI and NYPD clashed. The FBI told the NYPD that Abdelaziz was disloyal. The NYPD defended him, offering potential explanations for the polygraph’s detections of deception. Ultimately, the NYPD intervened and ended the polygraph.

The FBI wrote in its summary of its test results, “Deceptive with no admissions, interrupted and terminated by the NYPD.”

The FBI stopped using him as an informant and began trying to deport him back to Egypt.

Abdelaziz’s version of the story differs:

“When I went to Egypt, I didn’t want to go to Egypt. I was contacted by the CIA and FBI in Egypt. The FBI, they took my visas and after that, it went crazy. They make me take a lie detector test. I come back with them to an office in Manhattan. I took a lie detector test and I failed the lie detector test. A lie detector test normally takes an hour. It was not a lie detector test, it was an interrogation. I was there for 14 hours.

For 14 hours, I tried to stay cool, they asked me questions and after that they let me go but things are happening. Again, two months later, they want to do another lie detector test. Same guy. I failed it again. I failed one question. They wanna prove to the NYPD that I was dirty. They make me fail it. Then, I go to the NYPD, take a test and pass it.”

He also claimed that the FBI launched an investigation of the NYPD detectives who handled him.

That same year, Abdelaziz founded Dominance MMA Management, according to the company’s LinkedIn page.

Abdelaziz might have been arrested in 2009. Public records that appear to match him indicate that unspecified charges were filed in North Carolina.

Russell reported that the NYPD cut Abdelaziz off in April 2010 after he disobeyed the NYPD’s orders by traveling to Abu Dhabi for UFC 112. He used the special green card that the government issued to him in order to get a legitimate passport. Upon his return home, he was detained for unlawful departure and re-entry.

Abdelaziz claimed to Mawyer that he told the NYPD he was “quitting” his service as an informant. He then learned that his green card was no longer valid when he tried to come back into the U.S. from Vancouver. He depicts this as retaliation by the U.S. government because he didn’t want to be an informant anymore.

He was detained by the authorities and placed into an immigration holding cell. He said he was imprisoned for a few months and then released because he has epilepsy. The government monitored his movements by requiring him to wear an ankle bracelet.

A deportation hearing was scheduled for January 2011.

That’s when he reached out to Martin Mawyer to come forward with part of his story.

17. A Strained Relationship

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:08:00 +0000

17. A Strained Relationship

Ali Abdelaziz’s relationship with MOA became increasingly strained, decreasing his effectiveness as an informant.

MOA-affiliated sources say that many members in New York didn’t like him from the start and that his personality increasingly alienated people, even though Canadian members of MOA like Hussein Adams continued to covet his friendship.

A major break happened when he suddenly divorced his wife, Fatima.

Her father, Ihsan, and other family members were filled with resentment as she and her baby were abandoned. They claimed he had mistreated her during the marriage, too. It was widely known that Ihsan wanted to kill Abdelaziz and sources close to the situation believe he would attempt to do so today if given the chance.

Abdelaziz moved out of Islamberg as a result, greatly limiting his access.

MOA-affiliated sources say the final straw was when Abdelaziz refused to get rid of his dog. Sheikh Gilani preached that it is a violation of Sharia Law to keep a dog inside the home as a pet. Only guard dogs who were mostly kept outside were permitted.

He was choosing a dog over Sheikh Gilani, which offended any believer in the Pakistani cleric. It became apparent that Abdelaziz did not respect Gilani as a divine representative of Allah. He was almost expelled completely from the group over it.

According to some sources, Abdelaziz’s access was essentially over at this point. One described him as having become “irrelevant” after MOA realized that certain information was leaking to the U.S. government. However, Abdelaziz confidently told Mawyer that MOA would testify on his behalf if necessary (this was before the story came out).

Some heard that MOA began suspecting he was an informant, and that’s when all contact was minimized. Others believe MOA officials are lying about that in order to hide their embarrassment over being infiltrated.

Abdelaziz did say to Mawyer that there were a few “close calls” where MOA could have discovered that he was an informant.

Some sources heard that Abdelaziz told his closest MOA friends that he was a paid informant. If true, that means he was essentially acting as a double-agent for MOA, or some in MOA, against the U.S. government. These sources did not know when Abdelaziz allegedly revealed this.

In his conversation with Mawyer, Abdelaziz was defensive of the Canadian wing led by Hussein Adams, suggesting this circle around Adams was innocent. On the other hand, he had harsh words for the American MOA in New York.

This raises the possibility that, as an informant, Abdelaziz was only willing to incriminate some within MOA, while hoping to protect the others that he felt some affinity towards.

15. The White Hawk Investigation Suddenly Ends

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:06:08 +0000

15. The White Hawk Investigation Suddenly Ends

As frustration with the case grew, so did concern over the wisdom of a potential confrontation with MOA and its 22 or more “Islamic villages.”

The group has an apocalyptic ideology. The group was preparing for the day when hostile authorities would raid their camps, which they had a divine command to resist. Fears of another Waco—or series of Wacos—were warranted.

According to the U.S. Army’s collection of intelligence reports, one of the squad members twice tried to buy AR-15 rifles in South Carolina in August 2007.

And then, suddenly, in the final years of the Bush Administration, the investigation into White Hawk appeared to inexplicably shut down.

Those involved in the investigation were aghast. Some attributed it to political correctness and a lack of willpower.

One source aware of the investigation explained:

“The problem that law enforcement had is that it’s not against the law to train with weapons on private property or to legally purchase weapons, even if you are affiliated with an Islamic extremist group. The concern was that these tactical capabilities could be used in a coordinated action against U.S. citizens and/or interests….

[There was] emphasis on the tactical training that women and children participated in, as well as weapons’ capabilities and the legal purchases of weapons by MOA members who are not felons. It was known that MOA would use non-felons to get guns for those who are felons.”

The effort to investigate and monitor White Hawk Security International ceased. The federal personnel were redirected to other cases. Of course, there is always the possibility that the investigation has since been reopened.

However, as declassified documents and counter-terrorism sources have confirmed, broader investigations into MOA did not come to an end (though the scale may have been reduced).

And Ali Abdelaziz continued to be used as a confidential informant.

One FBI report included in the U.S. Army collection, dated September 2008, reiterated concern about a key MOA suspect who had gotten a job with the suspected purpose of acquiring the “military tactics, weapons and self-defense training sought by members of the MOA jama’ats [communes].”

The MOA infrastructure that so alarmed the authorities is still active today, with the same leaders, the same villages, and many of the same fronts, including White Hawk Security International.

Jamaal Johnston, the leader of White Hawk, even ran for the Virginia House of Delegates in 2017. Other prominent MOA members have run for Congress in Massachusetts and in Alaska.

The law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation, former MOA members, and Ali Abdelaziz share a common puzzlement as to why the group—or at least parts of it—haven’t been shut down.

There’s an understandable assumption that the federal government simply doesn’t care enough or is afraid of triggering a confrontation.

However, as concerning as MOA activity within America was and is, Abdelaziz and other MOA-affiliated sources say that the group’s activities overseas are of equal or greater concern. Abdelaziz said that MOA was increasingly shifting its focus to operations outside of the United States.

“Lots of Muslim leaders go to him [Gilani] for help,” he said.

Declassified documents emphasize that Gilani is linked to various jihadist groups. Other MOA-affiliated sources recall Gilani telling members that the funds they donate to him are used to finance “the mujahideen” in Kashmir.

Abdelaziz said that Gilani had also supported jihadists fighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kosovo.

The difficulties in getting visibility on MOA’s activities within North America pales in comparison to the difficulties in monitoring MOA’s “missions” in other countries.

The FBI arranged for Abdelaziz to get a special visa that allowed him to travel practically anywhere in the world. He could offer to help MOA establish and manage its “communities” in other countries.

If successful and trustworthy, Abdelaziz could shine the light on MOA’s international network.

14. Mission: Penetrate the Military Squad’s Training

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 23:02:17 +0000

The golden opportunity came when eight military squad members from six of MOA’s “Islamic villages” signed up for bodyguard classes held at a private facility in Virginia. They all purported to be employees of White Hawk Security International.

They signed up for a series of classes, including ones for unarmed guards and instruction on arrest authority and entry-level firearms training (though their performance was far from entry-level).

Abdelaziz joined the squad members and signed up for a firearms class. He passed along detailed information, pictures and documents to the authorities.

Below is the enrollment photo taken of Abdelaziz, exclusively obtained by Ryan Mauro and Martin Mawyer:

Ali Abdelaziz only showed up for one class, saying he had to leave early in order to go to Venezuela and set up a Mixed Martial Arts event there. Abdelaziz later told Mawyer that he met with a top MOA leader there, almost certainly referring to convicted terrorist Barry Adams.

We have also obtained the enrollment photos of the eight MOA military squad members. These members were (in the order that they are shown at the link):

Ihsan Abdullah from the “Islamberg” headquarters of MOA in New York. There is a 2nd camp next to “Islamberg” named “Maryamville.

Uthman Abdul Aziz from the “Mian Mir” camp in Coldwater, Michigan.

Faruq Baqi from Fresno, California, where MOA maintained a presence after they abandoned their “Baladullah” camp in California once its charter school scam was uncovered. Faruq Baqi’s mother, Khadijah Ghafur, was arrested in 2004 and convicted for her role in overseeing the scam, which funneled taxpayer money to Sheikh Gilani in Pakistan. This branch of MOA also infiltrated military bases in California by working as contractors.

Jahad Mumin Fatihah, from the “Madinah Village” in Commerce, Georgia. The state has at least one other MOA commune named “Aliville” near Jesup and Odum.

Jamaal Johnston, the leader of White Hawk Security International and a member of MOA’s “Ahmadabad East” camp in Meherrin, Virginia. There is at least one more camp in Virginia, “Ahmadabad West,” in Red House.

Muhammad Yasin Malik from the “Madinah Village” in Commerce, Georgia.

Ramadan Sayeed Shakir from “Islamville” in York County, South Carolina. He has served as the “mayor” of the commune.

Derrick Vaughn from the “Madinah Village” in Commerce, Georgia.

We have also obtained pictures from some of the squad’s visits to the firing range, such as this one below:

Here, two of the chosen “military squad” members are at the firing range as part of the training they received in security-related duties, including instruction in counter-terrorism.

The squad members showed up for the classes in cars with temporary tags. Each had a 9mm firearm. A couple of them wore Battle Dress Uniforms and one had a security badge on his belt.

The accuracy of their shooting far surpassed the typical police officer or security guard at the range (the lowest score was a 96% in one session). Additionally, their conversations showed they were experienced students, as they were familiar with advanced shooting tactics, stances, tactical withdrawals, etc.

However, they weren’t free of careless mistakes.

Faruq Baqi said “Praise Allah” after a few particularly impressive shots. They were overheard talking about putting high-speed triggers in guns, their visits to various MOA camps and attending other security-related classes.

During the classes, the MOA students asked an abnormal number of questions about the Patriot Act and the handling of AR-15s.

One of the courses attended by the MOA military squad members was a counter-terrorism course that was funded by a federal grant for homeland security.

The course included sessions about the roles of law enforcement and private security in the War on Terror; terrorism indicators; domestic terrorist and extremist groups; international groups; critical incident response; officer safety issues and active shooter situations.

Ironically, during one class, squad member Jahad Mumin Fatihah was reading The Terrorist Next Door by Erick Stakelbeck, which has a chapter about MOA.

Nonetheless, the federal investigators struggled to build their case. The squad’s tradecraft, combined with the investigators’ severe lack of resources and incredibly overworked personnel, make the investigation a behemoth of a task.

Those involved in the investigation complained aloud about the government’s bureaucracy failing to operate efficiency, which gave the impression that some of the higher-ups were dragging their feet on the case.

The complexity of the case resulted in discouraging mistakes. In one instance, investigators overlooked the easily findable fact that one of the squad members owned another security company. Another slip-up led the suspects to believe they had identified people who were cooperating with the authorities.

13. White Hawk

Ryan Mauro — Wed, 20 May 2020 13:56:29 +0000

13. White Hawk

Abdelaziz had an opportunity to infiltrate the military squad by becoming involved with one of its key fronts: White Hawk Security International Inc.

The name was inspired by the spiritual significance of white hawks in Sufi Islamic teachings. A former MOA member said, “Whenever there was something resembling a white around around, people would stare and say it was Sheikh Gilani visiting.”

White Hawk Security International (WHSI) was based out of a secretive, well-armed commune in Meherrin, Virginia that many MOA members didn’t even know existed.

From its very beginning, MOA has formed security companies as fronts as part of its modus operandi.

Counter-terrorism sources aware of the federal investigation into WHSI said that the Meherrin camp was justifiably viewed as a “terrorist training camp.” It was protected by armed patrols and hostile to visitors. One source relayed an incident where the local police requested entry and were denied permission.

The training inside the camp was overseen by WHSI’s leader, Jamaal Johnston. His father, a bail bondsman, also played a leading role.

WHSI was like the “hub of the wheel,” as one source connected to the investigation put it.

It was/is a centerpiece of an overlapping web of other MOA fronts across the country. Associated entities were found in Texas, California, Michigan, South Carolina, Georgia and other states.

WHSI even worked with the Defense Commissary Agency to provide security for federal buildings in Richmond. The company and other MOA-associated firms sought federal contracts, particularly those offered to minority-owned businesses. The anxiety of the counter-terrorism investigators was raised when an effort to get a contract with the TSA was discovered.

As the military squad’s activities ramped up, WHSI opened a tactical shop and constructed an outdoor firing range. Johnston required a Federal Firearms License that permitted him to acquire and transfer guns and ammunition across state lines.

Johnston’s online postings of his resume show that he completed the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services training for becoming a correctional officer. He worked at a medium-security prison, Deep Meadow Correctional Center, from August 2003 to September 2004.

His various publicly available bios say he was registered as a “Security Officer, Private Investigator, Personal Protection Specialist, Alarm Respondent, Electronic Security Sales Representative, Electronic Security Technician, 12ga shotgun and Advanced Firearms.”

Johnston purportedly had certificates in “.38 rev, AR-14, Chemical Agents, Specialty Impact Munitions” and other specializations. Another skillset he listed was “Ultron II” and “React Belt System,” referring to a device used to disable inmates with electric shocks.

His resume shows he also worked at an armored car company and ADT Alarm Systems, a company that other trusted MOA members have been employed also.

Federal investigators believed that MOA military squad members were jumping from job-to-job to gather intelligence and experience for the group’s wider use.

As for WHSI, its advertised services appear innocuous, like those offered by many other security-related firms. But when you take into account its status as a MOA front, those skills and services must be viewed in a different, more dangerous context.

One 2011 advertisement in MOA’s newspaper for WHSI stated that it had an office in Caroni, Trinidad.

This is where convicted MOA terrorist and current senior official, Barry Adams, was deported back to after serving his time for spearheading a plot to kill thousands of people by setting off bombs in Toronto in 1991. His Trini accomplices were also sent back home.

The advertisement stated that White Hawk offered bodyguards, licensed bailiffs, security consultants, risk assessment, auditors, private investigators, debt collectors and 24-hour monitoring and response for clients.

More recent advertisements for White Hawk show that MOA is actually offering classes for those seeking to become a security officer for the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, as well as classes for concealed carry permits. Also offered are specialty workshops in “Active Shooter, Crime/Workplace Violence Prevention, Security Awareness [and] Gun Safety.”

Other services offered include custom security plans, security for sports arena and entertainment venues, travel security, and reviews of security departments.

It’s easy to understand why the federal authorities were ready to invest significant resources into investigating WHSI when it learned that it was stocking up on firearms. Thousands of dollars with unclear origins were being spent on purchasing Glock pistols and multiple AR-15 Bushmasters and accessories for them like lights and rails.

In 2005, it was found out that MOA military squad members were signing up for classes for aspiring security guards and bodyguards, such as instruction in advanced firearms and martial arts. They usually declared themselves employees of WHSI or some other front as a cover. One class that squad members took in Norfolk was for rifle instruction.

Federal investigators learned that MOA was using its business fronts to get training applicable for militant and criminal purposes, and then teaching the skills to other MOA members in the U.S., Canada and Pakistan. They felt there was a strong likelihood that the tradecraft was being passed along to Sheikh Gilani’s extremist associates outside of MOA.

According to two sources involved in the investigation, material from classes that the WHSI personnel took were later found in the possession of suspected terrorists overseas in Pakistan and, according to one recollection, Iraq.

The intelligence from overseas showed that the extremists were being taught about American security procedures.

A directive had been given for MOA members to become registered security officers so they could be placed in sensitive sectors, including positions that could grant them access to private, confidential and classified information.

The effort was described as “very methodical” and “very well-planned.” MOA’s use of shell companies was “like a fictional movie, making it almost impossible to see who owns what” and where money was coming from or going to.

The operatives dropped their Islamic attire to fit in, in accordance with MOA’s long-established protocol for what it calls “incognitos” selected for “missions.” MOA material from its earliest days refer to these terms and strategies for covert operations.

The squad’s prowess impressed those observing their movements. The WHSI personnel were “more accurate than probably 90% of the police officers who attended the target practice.”

The training and acquirement of weaponry were intensifying.

WHSI personnel were seeking permits for automatics and explosives. They were discussing how to install high-speed triggers in guns.

The company was looking to sell supplies to police departments and the Department of Corrections, such as flash bang grenades, riot shields, firearms and tactical equipment.

Personnel claimed they had gotten contracts with about 20 police agencies and correctional institutions. They successfully got a contract with the Defense Commissary Agency, providing security for discounted grocery stores on military bases.

At some point in the investigation, videotape was acquired showing MOA members in Virginia, including children, getting advanced guerilla-type training. It was beyond the very basic training that women at “Islamberg” were seen receiving in a previous video from 2001/2002.

The flows of money within the U.S. and to foreign countries was of increasing concern.

In one instance, WHSI leader Jamaal Johnston and other MOA members held a fundraiser in the form of a basketball tournament with teams from different camps. One witness said that Abdelaziz participated in at least one tournament, predictably boasting that he was “the best.”

Investigators had intelligence that caused a specific federal interest in the basketball games. Several sources say that money went to Sheikh Gilani in Pakistan, where authorities believed it was used to support terrorist activity.

Charities like MOA’s “Hands to Hands” organization was also raising money for “humanitarian aid” following natural disasters, particularly after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. This, too, was believed to be a money laundering scheme with terror ties.

Gathering the evidence necessary to reach the high threshold for prosecution, however, was difficult.

Almost all the observed activity was legal and committed by American citizens with constitutional protections. It isn’t illegal to be in an extremist cult, nor is it illegal to acquire firearms or to form a security company.

It was and is not illegal to belong to MOA or Sheikh Gilani’s network, as it is not designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

MOA had studied the law for decades. They avoided leaving behind evidence of illegal activity that was strong enough to led to search warrants, wiretappings and arrests. These were dedicated, security-conscious operatives who had clearly practiced anti-surveillance techniques.

For instance, key operatives were changing their cell phone carriers every few weeks and constantly getting new phone numbers. It was a daunting task to keep track of the myriad of false identities, name alterations and constant opening and closing of front organizations.

And the membership was fiercely loyal. Even those who started to have doubts about Sheikh Gilani’s ability to perform miracles and people who left the organization declined to help law enforcement.

The authorities needed a confidential informant who was trusted by MOA, one who the group saw as a valued asset for its more militant ambitions.

In Ali Abdelaziz, or “Aladdin” as they called him, they had an Arabic-speaking, supposed Olympian martial artist with a lot of money. MOA viewed him as a prime candidate for MOA’s military squad.